Student Athletes and Drug Testing by Crowley, Donald
Marquette Sports Law Review
Volume 6
Issue 1 Fall Article 5
Student Athletes and Drug Testing
Donald Crowley
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/sportslaw
Part of the Entertainment and Sports Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Donald Crowley, Student Athletes and Drug Testing, 6 Marq. Sports L. J. 95 (1995)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/sportslaw/vol6/iss1/5
STUDENT ATHLETES AND
DRUG TESTING
DONALD CROWLEY*
When the Supreme Court announced in 1989 that government man-
dated drug testing of some employees was constitutional even in the ab-
sence of any reason to believe that these employees had used drugs, they
seemed to clear the way for more extensive testing at the federal, state,
and local levels.' The use of drug testing as a tool to deal with perceived
increases in the use of drugs has been supported by three consecutive
presidential administrations, numerous editorial columnists, and appar-
ently public opinion.2 This decision left unclear whether drug testing
could be required from those not involved in positions linked to public
safety. For this reason, the extent to which drug testing could be insti-
tuted by public schools, colleges, and universities for their student ath-
letes remained open to debate. The Court's recent decision involving
athletes in an Oregon public school only partially answers the relevant
questions. This Article will analyze the issues and recent judicial activity
of particular relevance to this subject.
While public opinion appears to be generally supportive of drug test-
ing of student athletes, by the late 1980s few school districts had under-
taken this approach. In 1986 the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA) provided a major boost for testing when, as part of
its program of drug education for athletes, it instituted a program for
drug testing of players involved in championship events The Associa-
tion has discussed expanding this policy to include testing on a more
regular basis, but at this point drug testing of athletes in non-champion-
ship events remains limited to testing football players for the use of ster-
* Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Idaho. Dr. Crowley has written
at some length on constitutional law and judicial issues.
1. The Court announced its views on drug testing in two 1989 decisions, National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989), and Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives
Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
2. See, for instance, poll done by Gallup for Newsweek, Aug. 11, 1986. Also see NBC
News-Wall Street Journal Poll in National Journal, Feb. 25, 1989. Over the last several years
roughly 80% of incoming College Freshman have supported the use of drug testing by em-
ployees. For the most recent survey, see Tm CHRONICLE OF HIGmR EDUCATION ALMANAC,
Sept. 1, 1995, at 17.
3. For a general review of the program and rules pertaining to the NCAA's drug testing
policy, see 1994-1995 NCAA DRuG-TESTING EDUCATION PROGRAMS BROCHURE.
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oids. The Association has also encouraged member institutions to
develop their own program for drug testing and many have done so.4
The constitutionality of the NCAA's drug testing policies has not
been heard by the U.S. Supreme Court, although the issue has been
dealt with by several federal and state courts.' The constitutional issues
presented by the NCAA's policies are related to, but slightly more com-
plex than, the issues raised when the testing is conducted by a public
university. When a public university requires drug testing it is clearly
acting as a government agent and subject to whatever state and federal
constitutional limits are held to apply. However, when the NCAA en-
gages in drug testing, the issues are even more perplexing due to the
ambiguous status of the NCAA. If the NCAA is regarded as a private
association, then it is not subject to the same constitutional limitations
that apply to public universities. Thus, in the absence of statutory re-
strictions the NCAA may engage in drug testing of college athletes at its
discretion. 6 However, if the NCAA is a state actor, or at least suffi-
ciently intermingled with state actors so as to be classified as one, then
federal constitutional requirements do apply. Even if the NCAA is re-
garded as a state actor, it could still engage in drug testing that satisfies
Fourth Amendment standards.
I. THE NCAA DRUG TESTING POLICY
At its annual convention in 1986, the NCAA adopted a policy requir-
ing that student-athletes submit to a urinalysis prior to participation in
any championship or NCAA certified post season events. The urinalysis
would be conducted for a long list of banned drugs, including street
drugs and anabolic steroids.7 The NCAA adopted this policy with the
stated intent of insuring that "no one participant might have an artifi-
cially induced advantage, so that no one participant might be pressured
4. Id. at 16.
5. See Hill v. NCAA, 273 Cal. Rptr. 402 (Cal App. 1990); 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994);
O'Holloran v. University of Washington, 856 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1988).
6. Some state constitutions, like California's, have provisions that have been held to apply
to private actors as well as public actors. See Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994). Other
states have passed civil rights statutes which might provide grounds for limiting NCAA actions
with regard to drug testing. However, in Bally v. Northwestern University, 532 N.E. 2d 49
(Mass. 1989), a Massachusetts Court refused to apply the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act in
such a manner. Also, those seeking to assert a violation under section 1983 of the 1871 Civil
Rights Act are likely to meet the same barriers since they must prove that the NCAA acted
under "color" of state law.
7. See NCAA DRUG TESTNG/EDUCATION PROGRAMS, supra note 3, at 10.
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to use chemical substances in order to remain competitive, and to safe-
guard the health and safety of participants .... "I
Athletes at universities participating in NCAA sponsored events
have no choice in submitting to testing, at least not if they wish to con-
tinue playing in intercollegiate athletic events. At the beginning of each
school year, every athlete is required to sign a consent form agreeing to
the NCAA's drug testing procedure. Failing to sign the form on a yearly
basis automatically results in being declared ineligible for all athletic
competition.9 Interestingly, the penalty for refusing to sign the consent
form is more unforgiving than the drug testing program itself. Under
current regulations, an athlete who tests positive for any drugs on the
banned list will remain ineligible for one year but can be reinstated after
a year if a clean drug test is obtained.1
The school's role in the NCAA's program is pervasive. Even though
the testing is conducted by the NCAA at NCAA approved laboratories,
the school obtains the players' signatures on the consent forms and is
responsible for informing the players of the rules. If a player tests posi-
tive, the school is first informed and if an appeal is desired, it must be
filed by the school. Finally, if the appeal fails, the school must suspend
the player or it will be subject to further NCAA penalties."
Although separate from the policy described above, the NCAA has
also encouraged member institutions to develop their own drug testing
programs and supplies suggested guidelines on the procedures that
should be followed.2 Indeed, there is a reasonable amount of pressure
for a major school to do so, lest they have players who test positive at the
most inopportune time, immediately prior to a championship event. As
a result, most division one schools have established some form of drug
testing program.' 3
There is little doubt that the programs are popular. According to a
Michigan State University study conducted for the NCAA, sixty-four
percent of the American public supported the use of drug testing for
8. Id. at 6.
9. Id. at 8. Not unlike loyalty oaths such consent forms punish those who as an act of
conscience refuse to sign them. However, a track star (for example) using steroids during the
summer but not likely to participate in any NCAA championship meets until the late Spring
would have over half a year to either stop taking the steroids and/or find a way to mask them.
10. Id. at 9.
11. Id. In particular the school will forfeit any post season game in which it knowingly
played someone who tested positive for a banned drug. This includes forfeiting any proceeds
from the event.
12. Id. at 16.
13. See 1990 NCAA DRUG EDUCATION AND DRUG TESTING SURVEY, § 5.
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college athletes. 4 Interestingly, the public's perception of the extent of
the problem is not consistent with the data on general usage by athletes.
According to the Michigan State study, student athletes' use of drugs fell
between 1985 and 1989. In this same period, public and even the ath-
letes' perceptions of a drug problem in college sports increased. 15
The support for drug testing notwithstanding, its effectiveness is open
to considerable debate. Since the program was started in 1986, less than
one percent of the athletes have tested positive. 16 Some have argued
that this low number demonstrates that testing is having a deterrent ef-
fect, but without baseline data for comparison, it is more of an assump-
tion than a demonstrable fact.' 7 If drug use was low and a drug testing
program therefore resulted in few positive tests, this would hardly be
evidence of a deterrent effect. The Michigan State study does suggest a
general decline in the use of some illegal drugs (particularly cocaine and
marijuana) between 1985 and 1989 with further declines recorded in the
14. See REPLICATION OF THE NATIONAL STUDY OF THE SUBSTANCE USE AND ABUSE
HABITS OF COLLEGE STUDENT ATHLETES (conducted by the College of Human Medicine,
Michigan State University (Oct. 1989)). This study involved a questionnaire sent out to over
2,000 student athletes and like most studies of its kind does not necessarily measure drug use
as much as it measures admitted drug use and stated attitudes.
15. According to the Michigan State Study, support by athletes for drug testing increased
from 48% to 62% in the period while the survey indicated a decline in use in most categories.
Interestingly, the athletes perception that drug use was a problem increased in the period.
Whether this was because of increased media and public attention to the issue or other factors
is unclear. This apparent inconsistency is similar to data on perceptions of crime discussed by
STUART SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF LAW AND ORDER (1984).
16. There has been a marginal downward trend since 1.2% tested positive in 1987. In the
Fall of 1993 only 0.3% tested positive. In the Fall of 1994 0.8% tested positive, most for
marijuana. See CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, June 6, 1990, at A32; Possible Drug-Test
Rate Increased During 1994, NCAA NEws, June 14, 1995, at 1 and 16.
17. Evidence of a deterrent effect cannot be demonstrated on the basis of the number of
positive tests obtained since the program began. One article accused a California trial court
judge of engaging in circular reasoning because he concluded that the NCAA statistics showed
no deterrent effect from the testing. According to this author, "it does not require a great leap
of logic to conclude that the reason there is little evidence of drug use is because of the regula-
tory efforts, not despite them." David Cochran, The Privacy Expectation: A Comparison of
Federal and California Constitutional Standards for Drug Testing in Amateur Athletics, 17
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 533, 548-49 n.136 (1990). Actually, it does require a great leap of
logic. Unless one has baseline date demonstrating the level of use before testing (or there is a
substantial decline in the number of positive tests) it is simply an unproven assumption to
conclude that the testing has had a deterrent effect. The author quoted above seems to as-
sume that any time a regulatory effort is undertaken and noncompliance is found to be low
then the program must be working. Before this is a reasonable conclusion one needs to know
what the noncompliance rate was before hand, otherwise it is possible that the problem was
simply overstated to begin with. In this case it is also possible that the tests are not ascertain-
ing the actual number of those who use drugs.
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most recent 1993 survey. 18 However, this decline is roughly similar to
the drop in the use of illegal drugs documented by other national
surveys. 19 To attribute the decline in illegal drug use by college athletes
to drug testing while ignoring other cultural messages that might also
have accounted for such a decline is highly questionable. Interestingly,
the Michigan State study shows that in the 1985-1989 period the use of
anabolic steroids did not decline, but marginally increased among foot-
ball players. By 1993 the overall use of steroids had dropped among
male athletes but showed "considerable increases" in reported steroid
use among female athletes.20 Since the use of steroids is most readily
associated with the NCAA's stated goal of insuring fair competition, this
is further reason to doubt the effectiveness of the NCAA's program.2'
Apart from the deterrence argument, drug testing also raises troub-
ling questions about accuracy and personal privacy. Given the range of
drugs for which the NCAA seeks to test and the difficulties inherent in
drug testing in general, the testing program cannot avoid the possibility
of false positives.22 Indeed, even eating a poppy seed muffin might re-
sult in a person testing positive for opiates. Although the NCAA spends
over a million dollars a year and employs what are generally considered
to be the most reliable methods available, it still is unable to avoid mak-
18. See 1989 Michigan State Study, supra note 14, at Table 7; SECOND REPLICATION OF A
NATIONAL STUDY OF THE SUBSTANCE USE AND ABUSE HABITS OF COLLEGE STUDENT ATH-
LETES, Figure 4 (NCAA 1993).
19. See NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE (published by the National Institute on
Drug Abuse).
20. The 1989 survey showed a marginal but statistically insignificant increase of reported
steroid use among football players. The 1993 survey showed a drop from 9.7 to 5% for foot-
ball players. All other sports were lower than this. Even though the authors of the study
described the use of steroids by women athletes as having undergone a "considerable in-
crease" it should be pointed out that women track and tennis participants reported the highest
usage at 2.7%.
21. While the scientific evidence on whether steroids actually enhance perforce isn't terri-
bly persuasive the Michigan State studies suggest that this is the primary reason they are used.
The 1989 study found that 82% used steroids to improve performance and 18% to recover
from an injury. In the 1993 study these numbers were 65% and 21% respectively. See Table
15 of the 1989 study and Table 10 of the 1993 study. It is also interesting to note that less than
2% of the athletes surveyed stated that they didn't use steroids because of the fear of getting
caught.
22. The predictive ability of drug testing depends upon a wide range of factors and in
some cases carries a high possibility of false positives. See, Wells, Halperin, & Thun, The
Estimated Predictive Value of Screening for Illicit Drugs in the Workplace, AM. J. OF PUB.
HEALTH, July 1988, at 817-19. According to the 1993 Michigan State Study, 18.6% of those
tested stated that "they, or one of their teammates had 'beaten' one of their school's drug
tests." (p.13). This suggests that there may also be a false negative problem but it also raises
further questions about deterrence.
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ing determinations about the presence of some banned drugs that, in the
words of one of their own doctors, is simply an "educated guess." 3 One
court even concluded that "students can be declared ineligible under the
NCAA program for merely passively inhaling marijuana smoke in a
room." 24 While the questions about the effectiveness of drug testing are
important, they have not been a central issue when addressing the con-
stitutionality of such programs. The first major hurdle that must be
passed if someone intends to challenge the constitutionality of the
NCAA's policies involves the status of the NCAA as a state actor.
II. THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
The state action doctrine ranks as one of the more illusive doctrines
of constitutional law. As an abstract concept it is fairly easily explaina-
ble, but its application to actual situations is much more problematic. As
a concept of federal constitutional law, the doctrine applies to the notion
that constitutional rights act as restrictions on government actors but not
private individuals, businesses, or groups. Thus, the ban against unrea-
sonable searches restricts government intrusions into one's personal ef-
fects, but does not limit the ability of a snoopy neighbor to investigate
your basement activities. While the neighbor might be subject to a tres-
passing charge, he cannot be held to have violated the Fourth Amend-
ment. The state action doctrine is most often associated with the passage
of the Fourteenth Amendment. When the post Civil War Congress
passed an extensive Civil Rights bill that limited the actions of many
private businesses and individuals, the Supreme Court claimed that since
the Fourteenth Amendment was addressed to state actors only, Congress
did not possess the power to limit the discriminatory practices of private
businesses and individuals. "Individual invasion of individual rights is
not the subject-matter of the amendment. It does not authorize congress
to create a code of municipal law for the regulation of private rights; but
to provide modes of redress against the operation of state laws, and the
action of state officials ...."I
This interpretation of the limits of the Fourteenth Amendment and
the necessity of finding state action before constitutional rights can be
vindicated has remained settled judicial doctrine.26 What has baffled the
23. See Hill v. NCAA, 273 Cal. Rptr. 402, 415 (1990)(quoting testimony of an NCAA
doctor).
24. Id.
25. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
26. Dissenting in the Civil Rights Cases, Justice Harlan claimed that private property be-
came "clothed with a public interest" when used in such a way as to "make them of public
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Court, as well as its legions of commentators, is determining what degree
and type of state action is allowable. As one commentator put it, "State
action is a sea in which everything else floats. For this reason constitu-
tional theorists often conclude that the question is seldom whether there
is state action but whether the obvious state action (including obvious
state inaction) is acceptable." 27 The problem has been made both more
crucial and more difficult to answer as government has come to partici-
pate in, regulate more, and engage in more activities with private busi-
nesses and associations. Indeed, a restrictive or narrow reading of what
constitutes state action may make it possible for government, in concert
with private actors, to accomplish indirectly what it cannot constitution-
ally do directly.
In an era of "privatization" in which government agencies are finding
it increasingly desirable to contract out for the performance of certain
services, it is even more important to recognize that achieving the bene-
fits of market efficiency should not be obtained at the cost of protecting
the basic rights of citizens. As Justice Brennan once observed with rela-
tion to providing medical care for prisoners, while "[t]he Government is
free.., to privatize some functions it would otherwise perform .... such
privatization ought not automatically release those who perform Gov-
ernment functions from constitutional obligation."
There are important reasons for maintaining the requirement that
state action must be present before constitutional rights apply. A claim
that constitutional provisions apply to all situations irrespective of the
presence of government action would have a variety of undesirable ef-
fects, particularly in regard to protecting the availability and possibility
of maintaining truly private associations and the liberties that are given
meaning and substance by such associations. However, given the degree
to which government is increasingly interlocked and intertwined with
private groups, it is necessary to recognize the need for a fairly broad
view of what constitutes state action. A broad view would recognize that
when government acts in concert with private groups, there is a particu-
lar need to protect the rights of individuals who otherwise might be pow-
erless against the coercive power of large organizations. As one legal
scholar put it:
consequence." While the analogy is imperfect, clearly the activities of the NCAA are of pub-
lic consequence and have thus become "clothed with a public interest." Id. at 42.
27. C. Edwin Baker, Private Power, the Press, and the Constitution, 10 CONST. COMMEN-
TARY 422, 422 (1993).
28. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522,560 (1987)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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The emphasis on the government's power is not meant to sug-
gest that state action should be limited only to direct government
acts. In fact, recognizing the pervasiveness of government's reach
perhaps argues most strongly for a broad definition of state ac-
tion, sensitive to the many ways the state can influence, directly
or indirectly, private behavior.29
Despite such warnings, the current Supreme Court has not taken a
broad view of state action. Indeed, they have taken a very narrow and
rather formalistic view of when private actors are considered to be acting
in concert with the state. Reversing a Warren Court trend toward a
more expansive concept of state action, the Burger Court and the Rehn-
quist Court have increasingly demanded greater demonstrations of state
involvement before the state action requirement is fulfilled.30 As devel-
oped throughout the mid-twentieth century, the Court settled on two
general tests to help determine the necessary degree of state action.
First, if the function performed by the private actor was one that had
been traditionally performed by government, then the private action
could be seen as public.3 ' A second approach, the state involvement
test, examines whether the state's involvement with the private party has
been so pervasive that it significantly facilitates or supports the chal-
lenged actions of the private party.3 2
While these general tests appear reasonable, they are, like all
Supreme Court tests, capable of being pulled or stretched in various di-
rections. Those favoring a broad reading of state action might find that
any amount of government aid to a private party constitutes state in-
volvement. In contrast, those wishing to limit the state action doctrine
could easily insist that only a few functions are traditionally governmen-
tal and only the most direct type of governmental control can constitute
state involvement. Further, those wishing to limit the scope of judicial
activity might well argue that the tenets of judicial restraint demand that
the Court interpret the state action doctrine narrowly, thus leaving dis-
gruntled individuals only very limited means of challenging supposedly
private authority. Whether to limit the reach of constitutional rights, or
to limit the involvement of the federal judiciary, the Burger and Rehn-
29. Scott Sundby, Is Abandoning State Action Asking Too Much of the Constitution?, 17
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 139, 143 (1989).
30. See Hala Ayoub, The State Action Doctrine in State and Federal Courts, 11 FLA. ST.
U.L. REv. 893 (1984); Henry Strickland, The State Action Doctrine and the Rehnquist Court,
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 587 (1991).
31. Ayoub, supra note 30, at 895.
32. Id. at 896.
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quist Courts have tended toward an extremely narrow interpretation of
the state action doctrine.
In three decisions in 1982 the Burger Court used variations of the
tests described above to limit the reach of the state action doctrine.
While still asserting that state action can only be found if the private
entity has exercised powers that are "traditionally the exclusive preroga-
tive of the state," the Court has been noticeably reluctant to hold that
private actors are performing such functions.33 By emphasizing the no-
tion of exclusivity, the Court is not inclined to find very many actions
that meet this requirement. In a similar vein, the Court argued that the
state involvement test can be satisfied only if the actions of an otherwise
private actor are "fairly attributable" to the stateA4 While this would not
appear to be much of a shift in emphasis, the Court has indicated that
before a deprivation of a right can be "fairly attributable" to the state, it
must be demonstrated that a private party charged with a rights violation
"acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state
officials. 35
III. Ti-m NCAA As A STATE ACTOR
The importance of this brief overview of the state action doctrine to
the NCAA's drug testing policies should be apparent. If the NCAA is
considered a state actor under the Fourteenth Amendment, then a wide
variety of constitutional protections, including the Fourth Amendment's
protection against unreasonable search and seizures, become available
to those who are affected by their actions. Thus, the central issue be-
comes the classification of the NCAA. The NCAA is a voluntary ath-
letic association that has always been closely connected to public
institutions. It was formed in the early part of the twentieth century af-
ter President Theodore Roosevelt called two White House conferences
to encourage reform in college football.36 The Association has gradually
grown in members, power, prestige and wealth. Today it consists of 906
member schools active in one of the three levels of athletic competi-
33. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1005 (1982) (citing Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974)).
34. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 830, 937 (1982).
35. Id. The Court's notion of what constitutes significant aid is apparently quite stringent
since they found that the actions of a private school for maladjusted students were not fairly
attributable to the state even though the state contributed 90% of the school funds and was
responsible through referrals for most of the schools students. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,
457 U.S. 830 (1982).
36. GLENN M. WONG, ESSENTIALS OF AMATEUR SPORTS LAW 107 (1988).
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tion.37 Over half of the members are public institutions. The structure
of the NCAA is complex but the principal administrative body is a forty-
six member committee known as the NCAA Council. The majority of
the Council is made up of athletic directors from member institutions.
The Council's decisions can be checked by a majority vote of the dele-
gates at the annual convention. There is also a President's Commission,
which is made up of forty-four Chief Executive Officers elected from the
general membership. In recent years this body has sought to exercise
more policy making control over the athletic director dominated Coun-
cil. As the President of the University of Iowa commented after success-
fully passing several reform measures:
Contrary to the president's own expectations, our control of
the NCAA was relatively simple to assert and, once established,
nearly absolute. But this should not have surprised anyone, be-
cause the NCAA is its member institutions, and they are run by
presidents. Narrow athletic interests are powerless in the face of
presidential will and consensus. 8
While the power struggle between presidents and athletic directors is
interesting what is clearly more important is that the majority of both the
Council and the President's commission are representatives of public
universities.3 1 The connection between the NCAA and public institu-
tions is not simply limited to questions about membership and who exer-
cises control. Money is an important, some would say essential part of
the relationship.4" The financial ties run in both directions. The NCAA
receives dues from its member institutions while many Division I schools
find the money returned from championship events like the NCAA bas-
ketball tournament and major bowl games to be crucial to stemming the
red ink in many major athletic programs.4'
A third factor which tends to intertwine public institutions and the
NCAA is the fact that as long as public universities stay members,
NCAA rules are binding on them. Thus, whether the issue is eligibility
of students, drug testing policies, or recruitment of students-athletes, the
NCAA's interpretation of the rules and facts of any dispute are binding
37. See 1993-1994 NCAA DiRECroRY.
38. Hunter T. Rawlings, Why did We Take So Long?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 21,1991,
at 72.
39. My compilation of the institutional affiliation of members of the Council and Presi-
dent's Commission. See 1993-94 NCAA DIRECTORY.
40. See generally MURRAY SPERBER, COLLEGE SPORTS, INC. (1990).
41. As Sperber argues such payments rarely result in balancing the athletic department
budget but the drive for the pot of gold continues unabated. See id. at 42-48.
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on the institution. The NCAA operates on the principle of institutional
control. This means that the association does not punish a coach or ath-
lete directly, but instead it requires the school to do so. If the school
chooses not to enforce an NCAA ruling, it can be put on probation or
banned from NCAA competition entirely. Thus, membership in the As-
sociation puts universities in the position of ceding a significant degree
of their rulemaking authority over athletes to an outside agency. From a
constitutional perspective, this would not be so problematic if the
outside agency was also required to satisfy basic constitutional
protections.
Prior to the 1980s, most courts found the NCAA to be a state actor.
Indeed, in the 1970s five different federal appeals courts found NCAA
actions to be sufficiently intertwined with public institutions to require
constitutional scrutiny.42 These courts generally noted the interlocking
relationships stemming from funding, membership, and rulemaking in
concluding that NCAA actions were tantamount to state action and thus
must adhere to constitutional provisions. Even though no particular
state or government body is in sole control of the NCAA, one federal
court noted that it would be a "strange doctrine indeed to hold that the
states could avoid the restrictions placed upon them by the Constitution
by banding together to form or to support a 'private' organization to
which they have relinquished some portion of their governmental
power."43 In two other cases, federal appeals courts even held that
NCAA rules, when applied to private schools, constituted state action
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment because the degree of
entanglement between the NCAA and public institutions had led to a
"symbiotic relationship between public and private entities which trig-
gers constitutional scrutiny.""
IV. A STRANGE DOCTRINE
Apparently reacting to the Burger Court's more restrictive view of
the state action doctrine, federal courts in the 1980s became less inclined
to conclude that the NCAA was a state actor. This shift certainly was
not brought about by any change in the nature of the NCAA or its rela-
tionship to public universities. Indeed, in the 1980s the NCAA contin-
42. See James Arslanian, The NCAA and State Action: Does the Creature Control its
Master?, 16 J. CorcrEMP. L. 333, 335-38.
43. Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028, 1033 (5th Cir. 1975).
44. Arslanian, supra note 42, at 337. See also Howard University v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213
(D.C. Cir. 1975); Regents of the University of Minnesota v. NCAA, 560 F.2d 352 (8th Cir.
1977).
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ued to prosper as the association grew to over $100 million in yearly
revenues, and university athletic departments looked ever more fondly
on achieving post season success. 45 Nevertheless, in 1984, a federal ap-
peals court accurately anticipated the U.S. Supreme Court's future direc-
tion by holding in Arlosoroff v. NCAA that the "indirect involvement of
state governments" was not sufficient to "convert what otherwise would
be considered private conduct into state action."'46 To this court the no-
tion that challenged action must be "fairly attributable" to the state
meant that it must be demonstrated that public universities were solely
responsible for the NCAA's policies. Since it had not been shown that
"representatives of the state institutions joined together to vote as a bloc
to effect adoption of the Bylaw over the objection of private institu-
tions," the Court concluded that one could not reasonably conclude that
the NCAA was a state actor.47
Given the fact that Arlosoroff dealt with a challenge to a private uni-
versity (Duke) carrying out NCAA regulations, one still could have ar-
gued that when a public university seeks to enforce NCAA rules it must
operate under constitutional constraints. However, even this potential
distinction became meaningless when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on
the case of Jerry Tarkanian, basketball coach at the University of Ne-
vada-Las Vegas.
The Tarkanian case involves a rather convoluted set of facts that lend
themselves to a variety of interpretations. The essentials of the story are
that the NCAA engaged in a lengthy investigation of Tarkanian's basket-
ball program at UNLV and eventually concluded that the school had
committed thirty-eight infractions, including ten directly attributable to
Coach Tarkanian.48 Of these ten, the most serious was the claim that
Tarkanian had attempted to frustrate the investigation by concealing in-
formation and seeking to get others to change their testimony.49
Tarkanian was allowed a hearing before the Infractions Committee,
although Tarkanian argued that the proceedings fell short of due process
standards. As one legal scholar summarized Tarkanian's hearing, "The
NCAA's evidence consisted solely of two enforcement staff investiga-
tors' oral recollections of interviews with individuals concerning their
knowledge of alleged NCAA rule violations by Coach Tarkanian. Those
45. The NCAA's phenomenal growth continues. Its projected budget for 1995 is $225
million. See NCAA NEws, July 19, 1995, at 1.
46. Arlosoroff v. NCAA, 746 F.2d 1019, 1021 (4th Cir. 1984).
47. Id. at 1022.
48. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454 (1988).
49. Id. at 459.
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'informants' were not present to give testimony nor to be cross-ex-
amined."50 After the hearing, the Infractions Committee's final report
recommended that UNLV remove Coach Tarkanian from the athletic
program for two years.51
UNLV and the Nevada Attorney General conducted their own inves-
tigations and obtained evidence at odds with the NCAA's conclusions.5
Despite the fact that UNLV was critical of the NCAA procedures and
many of its findings, the school concluded that their membership agree-
ment with the NCAA obligated them to accept the NCAA's findings.
Thus, after losing an appeal before the NCAA, the University decided
that it had no alternative but to enforce the proposed sanctions against
Tarkanian.53
The day before the sanctions were to take effect, Tarkanian filed suit
against the University claiming that his due process rights had been vio-
lated. Although Tarkanian initially won, the case was ultimately retried
with the NCAA as a party to the suit. Tarkanian won again.54 As the
Nevada Supreme Court saw the relevant issues, the NCAA was a state
actor on two grounds. First, Tarkanian was a public employee (with ten-
ure) and disciplining "public employees is traditionally the exclusive pre-
rogative of the state."' 5 Second, the court argued that "by delegating
authority to the NCAA over athletic personnel decisions and by impos-
ing the NCAA sanctions against Tarkanian, UNLV acted jointly with the
NCAA. '5 6 Since the NCAA was considered to be a state actor, the
court argued that its procedures had violated Tarkanian's Fourteenth
Amendment rights to due process.
When the NCAA appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Rehn-
quist Court was given another opportunity to narrow the reach of the
state action doctrine. In a five to four decision, the majority rejected the
way the Nevada Court had framed the issues. From the perspective of
the Court, this case was uniquely different from other state action cases,
which typically involve a private party taking steps that harm an individ-
ual. In a typical case raising the state-action doctrine, the "question is
whether the State was sufficiently involved to treat that decisive conduct
50. Arslanian, supra note 42, at 342.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. UNLV's other options were either to pull out of the NCAA or to refuse the penalties
against Tarkanian and risk the probability of stiffer sanctions against the program itself.
54. Arslanian, supra note 42, at 344.
55. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 741 P.2d 1345, 1348 (Nev. 1987).
56. Id. at 1349.
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as state action. 57 This is of course exactly how Tarkanian and the Ne-
vada Supreme Court perceived the case. However, Justice Stevens, for
the Court's majority, believed that "these contentions fundamentally
misconstrue" the facts.5
To the Court, the relevant fact was that the NCAA did not directly
impose penalties on Tarkanian; it only threatened to impose sanctions on
the school if it did not suspend Tarkanian. Indeed, the NCAA could not
directly suspend Tarkanian since the only direct authority it possesses is
against the member institution itself. Second, UNLV had other options
to suspending Tarkanian, as it could have accepted greater penalties
against the school or opted out of the NCAA.59 Third, the NCAA and
UNLV could not have acted jointly since UNLV had opposed most of
the actions of the NCAA.60 Finally, the NCAA cannot be considered to
have acted under color of Nevada law because the vast majority of
NCAA members reside outside the state. Indeed, the Court seemed to
argue that because the NCAA was independent of the control of any
state it could not be considered a state actor.61 Given this understanding
of the relevant facts and concepts, the Court concluded that since the
NCAA was not a state actor they could not have violated Tarkanian's
due process rights-only UNLV could have.
It would be ironic indeed to conclude that the NCAA's impo-
sition of sanctions against UNLV... is fairly attributable to the
State of Nevada. It would be more appropriate to conclude that
UNLV has conducted its athletic program under color of the poli-
cies adopted by the NCAA, rather than that those policies were
developed and enforced under color of Nevada law.6'
V. THROUGH = LOOKING GLAss
To use the Court's own metaphor, since the Tarkanian case "uniquely
mirrors" a typical state action case it was necessary "to step through an
analytical glass to resolve" it.63 Inadvertently, this was a metaphor that
Lewis Carroll would have found appropriate. The Court seemed at great
57. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454, 462 (1988).
58. Id.
59. According to Justice Stevens' UNLV could have simply opted out of the NCAA.
From his perspective the fact that UNLV's options "were unpalatable does not mean that they
were nonexistent." Id. at 465.
60. Justice Stevens argues that by not appealing the Nevada Supreme Court decision the
University had scored a "total victory." Id. at 460.
61. Id. at 462.
62. Id. at 466.
63. Id. at 462.
[Vol. 6:95
STUDENT ATHLETES AND DRUG TESTING
pains to isolate the case from its apparent context and thus reach a con-
clusion at odds with the underlying purpose of the state action doctrine
itself. As the Court explains it: "Careful adherence to the 'state action'
requirement preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the
reach of federal law" and avoids the imposition of responsibility on a
State for conduct it could not control.r a
By seeing the case through its self imposed "analytical looking glass"
the Court narrowed the range of individual freedom by limiting the
reach of constitutional fights and made a state responsible for actions
that for all practical purposes it could not control. If the NCAA is a
state actor, it is a different type of state actor than what has typically
been encountered in past cases. But by adopting the "strange doctrine"
that an organization cannot be a state actor if a majority of members are
not located in any particular state, the Court blinds itself to the numer-
ous ways that such organizations can influence public institutions. Indi-
viduals being told by their school that they must follow NCAA rules are
not likely to be persuaded by the argument that the NCAA is not a state
actor because their rules were created by representatives of schools
outside the state.
One interpretation of the Court's argument is that states can escape
constitutional responsibility for their actions by joining organizations
with other states and then creating rules that bind their respective states.
However, this does not seem to be the Court's position. The majority
seems to be arguing that the actions of the organization cannot be con-
sidered state action, but the state itself may still be responsible to consti-
tutional restraints if it seeks to enforce the rules of the organization.
This latter interpretation is far less worrisome than the former, but even
this position is problematic. Tarkanian, for instance, won an injunction
against UNLV for carrying out the NCAA's proposed sanctions. If
Tarkanian could not take the NCAA to Court and UNLV could not im-
pose the sanctions, UNLV would either have to accept greater sanctions
or withdraw from the organization. Given the prestige and money asso-
ciated with participation in major sports, neither of these are reasonable
options for the University. Thus, it is not surprising that the school
opted to replace Tarkanian as its basketball coach by offering him a
settlement.
The Court's position may force other types of Hobson's choices. In-
deed, it is not unlikely that at least some athletes or coaches would de-
cide that rather than expose their school to increased penalties they will
64. Id. at 461 (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936-37 (1982)).
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simply drop their constitutional claim.65 While the exercise of any con-
stitutional claim may carry personal costs, they are usually somewhat
more indirect than the ones the Court seems to be endorsing here. Real-
istically, the only way an individual could force a change in such policies
is by getting an injunction against the university. If enough states were
put into this type of Catch 22, they could collectively force the NCAA to
reconsider its procedures.66 Given the organizational strength and
wealth of the NCAA, this is expecting a great deal from individuals
whose only real goal are getting the NCAA to pay attention to basic
constitutional concerns. Since this is not a situation where a broader
reading of state action would raise any legitimate issues of associational
privacy, or produce threats to any other types of protected liberty, it is
not clear why the court found it necessary to adopt such a restricted view
of the state action doctrine. What is clear, however, is that such a view
creates grave difficulties for any student-athletes compelled to challenge
the drug testing policies of the NCAA.67
VI. DRUG TESTING AND THE CONSTITUTION
Even if the NCAA is considered to be a state actor, this does not
automatically mean that its drug testing policies violate an athlete's con-
stitutional rights. The answer to this question depends upon how a court
balances the claimed privacy interests of the athletes against the claimed
special needs of the university and the NCAA. This, is the approach that
the U.S. Supreme Court has endorsed in the previous drug testing cases
that have come before it.
The Court's approach to drug testing is an outgrowth of the more
general approach of balancing that the Court has adopted in recent
Fourth Amendment cases. The initial step is to claim that the Fourth
65. A University of Colorado athlete explaining why she went along with the NCAA's
drug testing program noted that "The NCAA is a very big institution and, you know, I
wouldn't know how to fight that. I wouldn't be about to take my team's interests down the
tubes because I didn't want to do the urinalysis." See Univerity of Colorado v. Derdeyn, 863
P.2d 929, 941 (Colo. 1993).
66. To some degree this appears to be happening as legislation has been introduced in
several states to require that the NCAA follow due process in its dealing with students and
university staff. In response, the NCAA's executive director stated that if legislation of this
type keep universities from following the rules it might lead to the disqualification of some
universities. See Wint Winter, NCAA's Actions Affect Too Many to Let it Operate Above the
Law, USA TODAY, Mar. 5, 1991, at 10C.
67. For a discussion of federal attempts to have the NCAA considered a state actor as
well as state legislative attempts to require the NCAA to follow due process in its investigative
procedures, see Kevin McKenna, Courts Leave Legislatures to Decide The Fate of the NCAA
In Providing Due Process, 2 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 77 (1992).
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Amendment does not require warrants or probable cause since neither is
"an irreducible requirement of a valid search. ' 6 What is required is that
a search be reasonable, and according to Justice O'Connor "a determi-
nation of the standard of reasonableness applicable to a particular class
of searches requires 'balancing the nature and quality of the intrusion on
the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of
the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion'."69 This
methodology allows the Court considerable room for discretion. By
either understating the privacy interests at risk or by placing added em-
phasis on the government interests in obtaining some particular type of
information, it is easy for the Court to dispense with both the warrant
and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment.70
Although the Court's use of the balancing test has relaxed the proce-
dural requirements of the Fourth Amendment, in all but the most rou-
tine administrative searches the Court has required information that
focuses suspicion directly on the individual.71 Policies that call for peri-
odic drug tests on government employees or student athletes certainly
do not meet this threshold requirement. However, government lawyers
asserted that a showing of special needs should overwhelm even this pre-
viously minimum requirement.72
The U.S. Supreme Court had been silent on the issue until the 1988
term when the justices heard two cases that dealt with the extent to
which federal agencies can order drug testing. The two cases came to the
Court with conflicting decisions from the appellate courts. In one case,
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association, the Court reviewed a
policy of the Federal Railway Administration that sought to require both
alcohol and drug testing of train crews after an accident or when operat-
ing rules had been violated. A refusal to submit to a test would result in
the employee receiving a nine month suspension. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled that this policy was a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. Even though the ninth circuit used the balancing ap-
proach, it argued that without some degree of particularized suspicion
68. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985).
69. O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S. Ct. 1492, 1498-99 (1987).
70. See Don Crowley & Jeff Johnson, Balancing and the Expectation of Privacy, 7 PuB. L.
REv. 337 (1988).
71. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S. Ct. 1492 (1987).
72. Ironically, one of the federal government lawyers who argued that the special needs of
government should overcome the Fourth Amendment claims of individuals was former Solici-
tor General Charles Fried who argued the employee drug cases for the Justice Department.
Earlier in his career Fried wrote a widely read defense of privacy as essential to human
dignity.
1995]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
accidents or rule violations by themselves did not create reasonable
ground for suspecting drug usage.73 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals upheld the use of drug testing for Custom's Service employ-
ees who are selected for promotions.74 In National Treasury Employee's
Union v. Von Raab, the fifth circuit balanced the interests involved and
concluded that considering the need for "public confidence in the integ-
rity of the Service," the risk to public safety from employees that use
drugs, and the limited scope of the search-drug testing-even in the
absence of "individualized suspicion," was not unreasonable.75
VII. BALANCING AND DRUG TESTING
Given recent tendencies toward allowing governmental needs to out-
weigh Fourth Amendment claims under the Court's ad hoc balancing
approach, close observers of the Rehnquist Court were not surprised by
the two decisions on drug testing. In both cases the Court's majority
treated the drug testing as essentially administrative in nature and not
conducted for purposes of criminal investigation.76 For Justice Kennedy,
writing for a seven person majority in Skinner and a five person majority
in National Treasury Employee's Union v. Von Raab, classifying drug
testing as administrative justified dispensing with normal Fourth Amend-
ment requirements. Instead, the reasonableness of the search would be
determined by balancing the special needs of government against the
railroad workers expectation of privacy. In Skinner, Justice Kennedy
reasoned that even though the Fourth Amendment applied to the em-
ployees in question and blood and urine testing constituted a search and
seizure, the workers' expectation of privacy was diminished by the fact
that they were employed in a highly regulated industry.77 This dimin-
ished expectation of privacy was then weighed against the significant
government interests in ensuring a safe transportation industry. By ap-
73. Railway Labor Executives' Association v. Burnley, 839 F. 2d 575 (9th Cir. 1988).
74. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1987).
75. Id. at 179.
76. This claim was more accurate in Von Raab than in Skinner. In the former case, the
test results could not be used in a criminal prosecution without the employee's consent while
in the latter case the Federal Railway Administration could make test samples available for
litigation purposes.
77. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,627 (1989). The Court's use
of the "highly regulated industry" rationale to justify government's imposition of drug testing
is interesting given the fact that being a highly regulated industry is not sufficient government
entanglement to constitute state action. It seems that to the Court majority being heavily
regulated is sufficient grounds to justify governmental invasions of privacy but not a sufficient
basis to claim constitutional protection from actions by the industry.
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plying its balancing formula in this manner, the court reached the pre-
dictable result that drug testing under such circumstances was not
unreasonable.78
The most striking aspect of this opinion was not the Court's decision
to abandon both probable cause and the warrant rule, these niceties be-
ing easy victims of balancing. Rather, it was the Court's unwillingness to
demand that the Federal Railroad Administration show some degree of
suspicion focused on the individual. Prior to this decision, the Court had
been willing to jettison individualized suspicion only in situations
deemed to be routine administrative searches or border stops. 79 How-
ever, none of these previous situations had involved the degree of intru-
sion into an individual's privacy authorized here. In Skinner, the Court
eroded what some had thought to be the bottom line constitutional re-
quirement by minimizing the invasion of privacy and emphasizing the
importance of the information to be obtained:
In limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated
by the search are minimal, and where an important governmental
interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by
a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be rea-
sonable despite the absence of such suspicion. We believe this is
true of the intrusions in question here.80
To the Court the fact that this was a highly regulated industry whose
employees must undergo other types of medical screening in order to
maintain their jobs mitigated against the claim that drug and alcohol
testing constituted a highly intrusive invasion of privacy.8' Justice Ken-
nedy also asserted that the intrusion is minimal due to the lack of admin-
istrative discretion and the circumspect nature of the required
monitoring. The Court accepted the reasonableness of testing because
78. Alexander Aleinikoff has argued that the Court's increasing use of balancing threat-
ens the notion of constitutional supremacy. "For under a regime of balancing a constitutional
judgment no longer looks like a trump. It seems merely to be a card of a higher value in the
same suit." T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.
J. 943, 992 (1987). I would add that in recent Fourth Amendment cases the individuals inter-
est in privacy not only is not a trump it does not possess a higher value then the governments
"special needs" card.
79. See U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523 (1967). The Court's recent tendency to claim than an administrative search is a blanket
exception to the warrant requirement is certainly a novel argument. This claim is particularly
interesting given that the Fourth Amendment makes no distinction between criminal and civil
proceedings. See Lynn Searle' The Administrative Search from Dewey to Burger, 16 HASTINS
CONST. L.Q. 261 (1989).
80. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624.
81. Id. at 627.
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they were convinced that the tests would help to make railroad transpor-
tation safer. "Employees subject to the tests discharge duties fraught
with such risks of injury to others that even a momentary lapse of atten-
tion can have disastrous consequences."' The assumption that testing
will improve safety was crucial and ultimately overwhelmed other con-
siderations. If testing will help make the system safer, then any restric-
tion of testing that might frustrate this important governmental goal
becomes suspect. Thus, even the minimum requirement of individual-
ized suspicion is too great a burden to impose, since obtaining this type
of focused information would be difficult and hinder the railroad's abil-
ity to obtain the necessary information.83 Such an argument inverts our
traditional understanding of the Fourth Amendment since the legitimacy
of the search rests on government demonstrating a sufficient need for
information, not, as has traditionally been the case, whether there is any
reason to believe that an individual has engaged in misconduct.
Given its importance to the final outcome, one might have expected
the Court to carefully evaluate the effectiveness and accuracy of drug
testing as well as the ability of such tests to determine whether a person's
job performance has been impaired. Instead, the Court engaged in only
a perfunctory analysis of the efficacy of testing and accepted the conclu-
sions of the Federal Railroad Administration that testing would enhance
safety.' Without much discussion, the Court simply deferred to the
agency's position that testing can yield valuable information about job
impairment, and that even if it does not, testing will act as a deterrent to
the use of drugs.85 Both claims are highly problematic. However, the
82. Id. at 628.
83. The Court accepted the Federal Railway Administration's claim that an impaired em-
ployee would "seldom display any outward signs detectable by the lay person.... ." Id. This
difficulty plus the confusion likely to surround a major accident led the Court to assert that a
demand for individualized suspicion was impractical. This claim would not seem to be appli-
cable to drug testing of college athletes since the concern with public safety or the special
circumstances of an accident are certainly not present.
84. In rejecting the Court of Appeals' fear that drug testing might not always be accurate,
the Court simply asserted that the Agency found testing to be accurate and those challenging
the program failed to provide any "reason for doubting the Agency's conclusion that the tests
at issue here are accurate in the overwhelming majority of cases." Id. at 633.
85. The Court offered no evidence for its deterrence theory other than that employees
will know that they will be tested after an accident and that no one can know when an acci-
dent will occur. Id. at 630. In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens points out that most
people "do not go to work with the expectation that they may be involved in a major acci-
dent." Id. at 634 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Court brushed aside any doubts by asserting that those challenging the
regulations failed to prove that the agency's conclusions were wrong.86
Justice Kennedy's opinion upholding drug testing for customs offi-
cials seeking placement in a position which involves either the enforce-
ment of drug laws or carrying firearms was similar to Skinner. In Von
Raab, the Court again found "special governmental needs" which over-
whelmed the traditional protections of the Fourth Amendment. Thus,
according to the Court, the country's "interest in self protection could be
irreparably damaged if those charged with safeguarding it were, because
of their own drug use, unsympathetic to their mission.... ."8 Couched
in this way, whatever interests in privacy customs officials may possess
are trivial in comparison to "the veritable national crisis in law enforce-
ment caused by the smuggling of illicit narcotics."88 Given that the use
of drugs may affect an employee's judgment and fitness, any infringe-
ment of privacy expectations is outweighed by "the Government's com-
pelling interests in safety and in the integrity of our borders." 89 As in
Skinner, the Court uncritically accepted the Customs Service assertion of
need, but here, the Court was content with generalized assertions of a
national drug problem. There was no evidence presented which demon-
strated a drug problem in the Customs Service. The Commissioner of
the Custom Service even stated prior to announcing the testing policy
that he felt that "Customs is largely drug free."90 Again, the Court ac-
cepted the agency view that testing will provide the public with assur-
ances that their employees are above suspicion.91
Even though Justices Scalia and Stevens joined the majority in the
railroad case, they were unconvinced that the Customs Service program
had any real connection to any grave harm that it was likely to prevent.92
Less bothered than dissenter Justices Brennan and Marshall with the use
of balancing, Justices Scalia and Stevens insisted that the connection be-
86. Id. at 629. The problem of false inferences from a positive test did not bother the
court either, although it does not take much imagination to guess what the newspaper head-
lines would look like after an employee, associated with an accident, tested positive for drugs.
87. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 670 (1989).
88. Id. at 668.
89. Id. at 672.
90. Id. at 683 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
91. Customs Officers waiting for a promotion would seem to be more likely to escape
detection than the railroad employees in Skinner. The Court dismisses this claim but it seems
plausible that a Customs employee who knows he is coming up for promotion could manage
to avoid drugs until after the tests. In any case, performing such tests will hardly assure that
employees are above suspicion of bribery.
92. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 681. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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tween drug testing and any asserted government interest be more direct
and the alleged harm more imminent than that advanced by the Customs
Service.93 Although they accepted the testing in Skinner given "the long
history of alcohol abuse in the railroad industry," they saw no such evi-
dence relating to the Customs officers and suggested that the main pur-
pose of the Customs Service testing was to set an example.94 "I think it
obvious that this justification is unacceptable; that the impairment of in-
dividual liberties cannot be the means of making a point; that symbol-
ism, even symbolism for so worthy a cause as the abolition of unlawful
drugs, cannot validate an otherwise unreasonable search."95
Where Justices Scalia and Stevens saw a distinction between the two
programs, Justices Marshall and Brennan saw both as blatant violations
of the Fourth Amendment. Their principal complaint concerned the
Court's continued use of ad hoc balancing. Balancing, they claimed, has
led to reading the warrant and probable cause requirements out of the
Fourth Amendment in favor of a reasonableness requirement which is
"virtually devoid of meaning, subject to whatever content shifting judi-
cial majorities, concerned about the problem of the day, chose to give to
that supple term. '96
Apart from their lonely attack on balancing, Justices Marshall and
Brennan argued that even on its own terms the Court's approach was
flawed. Justice Marshall pointed out that initially the Court acknowl-
edged that "there are few activities in our society more personal or pri-
vate than the passing of urine," then the Court ignored its own words
and declared that drug testing is only minimally intrusive.97 After having
deflated the privacy interests at stake, Justice Marshall accused the ma-
jority of inflating the government's interest by uncritically accepting the
notion that testing will be an effective deterrent to drug use.98 The
Court's refusal to demand a closer connection between the use of drug
93. Id. While Scalia thought there was a clear connection between the frequency of drug
or alcohol use and train safety, he saw little connection between testing and any public harm
likely to occur in the customs case. "I decline to join the Court's opinion in the present case
because neither frequency of use nor connection to harm is demonstrated or even likely. In
my view, the Customs Service rules are a kind of immolation of privacy and human dignity in
symbolic opposition to drug use." Id. Some might have thought that such a position would
lead Scalia to be suspicious of testing of high school athletes but apparently that is not the
case. Apparently Scalia is more protective of the privacy interests of government employees
than high school athletes. Where college athletes fall on this scale would be hard to predict.
94. Id. at 684, 686.
95. Id. at 687.
96. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 637 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 647.
98. Id. at 653.
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testing and some "particularized facts" focused on the individual illus-
trates the extent to which the majority has been "swept away by society's
obsession with stopping the scourge of illegal drugs ...."99
Despite the objections raised by the dissenters, the effect of these
decisions was to justify drug testing for at least some categories of public
employment. The extent to which the Court will be willing to allow gov-
ernment ordered drug testing on its employees or employees in "highly
regulated" industries is not yet totally clear, but these decisions suggest
that when government can make a plausible claim to protecting public
safety the use of drug testing will be upheld.100
VIII. CHALLENGES TO TESTING ATHLETES
How these decisions apply to college athletes is open to debate.
Given the flexible nature of the ad hoc balancing employed by the
Court, one cannot be sure how drug testing of college athletes would be
viewed. Do the supposed "special needs" of government outweigh the
privacy interests of college athletes? Do the alleged deterrent effects
justify the intrusion? As discussed earlier, the issue has been blurred by
discussions regarding the legal status of the NCAA. Thus, in the wake of
Tarkanian, the NCAA has not been held to Fourth Amendment stan-
dards. However, in some states attempts have been made to argue that
even private associations must meet state constitutional requirements.
Beyond this, the Fourth Amendment and corresponding state constitu-
tional restrictions clearly apply to testing undertaken directly by either
public universities or public school districts. A variety of State and Fed-
eral courts have reached conflicting results in dealing with this issue.' 0'
In late 1993 the Colorado Supreme Court ruled against the Univer-
sity of Colorado's drug testing program. The challenged program di-
rectly presented the constitutionality of drug testing under the Fourth
Amendment. The University of Colorado's drug testing policy applied
to all students engaged in intercollegiate athletics including such indirect
99. Id. at 654.
100. For instance, the five person majority in Von Raab was uncertain whether all Cus-
toms Service employees cleared to handle "classified information" should be included in the
drug testing program. Apparently, the majority was prepared to uphold testing for those who
handle "sensitive information" but not for all employees that have classified clearance.
101. See, e.g., Hill v. NCAA 273 Cal. Rptr. 403 (Cal. App. 6th Dist. 1990); Bally v. North-
eastern University, 532 N.E.2d 49 (Mass. 1989); University of Colorado v. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d
929 (Colo. 1993). See also Schaill ex rel. Kross v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d
1309 (7th Cir. 1989).
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participants as cheerleaders, student trainers and managers. 10 2 The pol-
icy had been in force since 1984 and had undergone various revisions. In
its most recent version students signed consent forms allowing a urinal-
ysis at the annual physical and then another urinalysis if any student was
deemed suspicious after a random "rapid eye examination." In essence,
failing the rapid eye examination was thought to constitute "reasonable
suspicion" of drug use.10 3 The University argued alternatively that its
program was voluntary, only minimally intruded upon reasonable expec-
tations of privacy, and was supported by compelling state interests.'0 4
In University of Colorado v. Derdeyn, the Colorado Supreme Court
rejected all of these claims. The Court found that the program was
neither voluntary nor supported by reasonable suspicion. The Court did
not address the question of whether drug testing would be constitutional
if supported by reasonable suspicion. In balancing the competing inter-
ests, the Colorado Court did not minimize the privacy interests at stake
in the way the U.S. Supreme Court had in Skinner and Von Raab. The
Colorado Supreme Court argued that even if athletes are heavily regu-
lated and had already been subjected to NCAA drug testing in champi-
onship events, this did not constitute sufficient grounds for overriding
the significant privacy interests compromised by Colorado's policy.10 5
On the other side of the balance, the Colorado Court found the claims
made in support of a compelling state interest to be far from persuasive.
In particular, unlike Skinner or Von Raab, the Court saw no significant
public safety interest at stake. While granting that the school has a sig-
nificant interest in protecting the health and safety of its students, the
Court was not persuaded that such a claim justified the exercise of state
power in the absence of reasonable suspicion.10 6
A case reaching the opposite conclusion was decided by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court in January of 1994. In Hill v. NCAA, two Stanford
University student athletes challenged the NCAA's drug testing policies.
Despite the fact that Stanford University is not a public university and
the NCAA was not found to be a state actor, a California appeals court
held that the California State Constitution's guarantee of privacy pro-
tects individuals from invasions by both governmental and private ac-
tors.10 7 With the complicating state action issue made irrelevant, the
102. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 932.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 937.
105. Id. at 943.
106. Id at 945.
107. 273 Cal Rptr. 403 (Cal. App. 6th Dist. 1990).
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NCAA's drug testing policies were initially found to violate the athlete's
right to privacy. However, the California Supreme Court reversed and
upheld the constitutionality of the NCAA's policy. 08
In a split decision, the California Supreme Court acknowledged that
the right to privacy guaranteed by California's Constitution applied to
the NCAA, but ultimately accepted the organization's claim that its drug
testing policy was justified since it served to protect the health and safety
of student athletes and also because testing helped to promote "the in-
tegrity of intercollegiate athletic competition."'10 9 The Hill court did not
engage in a detailed analysis of Fourth Amendment considerations and
made it clear that such an analysis was not applicable to a private organi-
zation such as the NCAA. The court majority regarded the privacy in-
terests at stake as diluted by the "social norms that effectively diminish
the athlete's reasonable expectation of personal privacy in his or her
bodily condition, both internal and external."" 0 In interpreting what
type of standards to apply to the NCAA the Hill court was clearly defer-
ential to the prerogatives of the NCAA as a private association and re-
garded "the NCAA's stated motives not with hostility or intense
skepticism, but with a respectful presumption of validity.""'
There are considerable differences in the way these two State
Supreme Courts treated the underlying assumptions surrounding drug
testing of college athletes. One could argue that in a narrow sense the
decisions are not comparable since the Derdeyn case was argued under
the Fourth Amendment and its corresponding state provision, while the
Hill case was argued under the somewhat more ambiguous concept of a
right to privacy that had been added to the California Constitution by
initiative in 1972.112 Further, in Derdeyn the testing was done by a state
agency, while in Hill the testing was conducted by a private organization
which according to the California Supreme Court was not required to
demonstrate compelling reasons for their actions. These differences
108. 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994).
109. Id. at 659.
110. Id. at 658.
111. Id. at 660.
112. Proposition 11 in 1972 added the words "and privacy" to the list of inalienable right
possessed by the people of California. This right has long been held by California courts to be
a restraint on both government and business activities. There has been considerably less
agreement on what this right entails. The California Supreme Court in Hill never seriously
questioned the status of the NCAA as a private organization and spent much of its time debat-
ing whether the NCAA needed to demonstrate a compelling interest to pursue its drug testing
program. The majority decided that it did not need to demonstrate a compelling interest and
that in any case its interests were sufficiently important. Id. at 668.
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notwithstanding, it is apparent that the Colorado court was far more
sympathetic to the privacy interests compromised by drug testing and far
less convinced that the practice of drug testing college athletes furthered
significant public interests.
As the Derdeyn case illustrates, when privacy interests are taken seri-
ously, drug testing fails except in cases when suspicion is focused on the
individual. However, as long as the NCAA is seen as beyond constitu-
tional scrutiny, student athletes are rendered powerless to challenge its
program. Moreover, given the vagaries of ad hoc balancing, even when
the testing is conducted by a public university, some courts will continue
to erode the core protections of the Fourth Amendment. All that is
needed is an assertion that the special needs of schools to insure safety
and fair competition among athletes outweighs the minimal invasion of
an athlete's privacy. This tendency toward creating wholesale exceptions
to the Fourth Amendment by relying on generalized speculations of pub-
lic need undermines values central to our concept of limited govern-
ment. As Justice Marshall noted in Skinner, such decisions ultimately
"reduce the privacy all citizens may enjoy."'1 13 Such a cost seems a heavy
price to pay for symbolic reassurance that something is being done about
the nation's drug problem.
A case that clearly illustrates such an approach is the decision
reached by the U.S. Supreme Court in Vernonia School District v. Ac-
ton. 1 4 The Acton decision deals directly with the issue of drug testing of
athletes at the junior high and high school level and indicates considera-
ble judicial sympathy towards drug testing of athletes, although it is un-
clear how significant the particular factual background of this case will
be. In Acton, the drug testing policies of a small Oregon school district
were challenged by a young male who wanted to play football. The
Vernonia policy required that all students intending to play interscholas-
tic sports take a drug test at the beginning of the season and then poten-
tially be tested on a random basis throughout the season. This policy
was instituted in the fall of 1989 and was challenged by James Acton and
his parents in the fall of 1991, when James entered the seventh grade.11
The specific events that the school district offered to justify their pol-
icy occurred when James Acton was in elementary school. In the mid-
1980s school district administrators and officials became concerned with
what they perceived as a rise in drug and alcohol use and a marked in-
113. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 1433 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
114. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
115. Id. at 2390.
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crease in disciplinary problems. (It is interesting to note that during this
time frame national surveys showed a decline in teenage drug use while
national media attention and concern with drug use accelerated dramati-
cally. Whether Vernonia actually was experiencing an increase in drug
use or simply reflecting heightened national concern is next to impossi-
ble to determine.) 116 The evidence offered to the district court in sup-
port of a growing drug problem consisted of events such as a teacher
claiming to have frequently seen students smoking marijuana in a cafe
across the street from the high school, an English teacher receiving sev-
eral essays describing and "glorifying" student drug and alcohol use,
coaches attributing an injury and poor on the field execution to drug use,
and some students admitting to the use of marijuana. School officials
furthered testified to a general decline in discipline and complained of
an open revolt by significant parts of the student body which they felt
was being led by athletes.117
According to the federal district court these facts led the school dis-
trict to the "inescapable conclusion that the rebellion was being fueled
by alcohol and drug abuse .... ,"Ix The federal court of appeals was
somewhat less convinced by the school districts account of an out of con-
trol drug problem and noted that all the evidence showed was "that
there was some drug usage in the schools, that student discipline had
declined, that athletes were involved, and that there was reason to be-
lieve that one athlete had suffered an injury because of drug usage and
others may have." 1 9 By the time these events were distilled by the
Supreme Court, the majority was willing to characterize it as an "imme-
diate crisis of greater proportions than existed in Skinner.... "120 Even
116. Public perception of drug use in public schools first edged out discipline as the "big-
gest problem facing public schools" in 1986, and continued to increase through the time period
in which Vernonia first began to consider its drug testing policy. See GALLuP REPORT, Sept.
1989, Report # 288, at 41.
117. Judge Marsh of the Federal District Court asserted that the "evidence amply demon-
strated that the administration was at its wits end and that a large segment of the student
body, particularly those involved in interscholastic athletics, was in a state of rebellion." Acton
v. Vernonia School District 47J, 796 F.Supp. 1354, 1357 (D. Or. 1992). The Federal Appeals
Court was considerably less impressed that the evidence demonstrated such a drug fueled
rebellion and was only willing to conclude "that drug use appeared to be more extreme than it
should be and even seemed to be growing." Acton v. Vernonia School District 47J, 23 F.3d
1514, 1519 (9th Cir. 1994).
118. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1357 (D. Or. 1992).
119. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 23 F.3d 1514, 1519 (9th Cir. 1994).
120. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2395 (1995).
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the dissenters were willing to read the record as demonstrating "a drug
related discipline problem ... of epidemic proportions.''
These events formed the background to the development of
Vernonia's drug testing policy in the fall of 1989. The policy was ex-
pected to accomplish a variety of goals, most notably to deter the use of
drugs by athletes and, because of the alleged status of athletes as role
models, deter the use of drugs generally. As a practical matter approxi-
mately two-thirds of the student body participated in district sponsored
athletic activities.'22 Thus, testing athletes affected a far larger propor-
tion of the student body than the typical urban or suburban school dis-
trict. Given that Vernonia felt that its disciplinary problems and drug
use were interrelated, the policy was also expected to contribute to
greater order and control within the school. Finally, the policy was seen
as protecting the health and safety of the athletes.
By the time the policy was implemented, many of those who had par-
ticipated in the events used to justify the policy had graduated. Cer-
tainly, by the time James Acton challenged the policy all those in the
high school at the time of the sharp increase in disciplinary problems had
already left school. Using such incidents as a justification for a random
suspicionless testing policy shows how clearly such cases differ from nor-
mal Fourth Amendment cases. It is questionable to test someone due to
the indiscretions of one's classmates, and even more questionable when
one's privacy is intruded upon due to the conflicts of students long
removed.
Of course such concerns might be significantly weakened when pub-
lic safety is clearly at risk. This is the principle that emerges from Skin-
ner. But the public safety claim here is very weak if not nonexistent.
Clearly the school district was mainly interested in asserting control and
the drug testing of athletes was a highly visible, if not an effective means
of doing so. Choosing a testing policy instead of employing a more con-
certed effort at information and education indicates that the district was
more interested in social control than in aiding students to make respon-
sible choices. As John Gilliom has argued with respect to drug testing of
employees, such tests have the "power to pull the individual out of the
mass and lay him or her open for a scientific survey of behavior around-
121. Id. at 2406 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
122. According to the evidence presented at the trial, "60-65% of the high school stu-
dents and 75 % of the elementary school students participate in district sponsored athletics."
Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1356 (1992).
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the-clock ... ."23 "Since detailed and total information is essential to
the disciplinary society, one can easily see how a biological examination
such as a drug test would fit into the machinery of administration."' 2 4
Since the testing policy did not test for alcohol, and like most testing
policies was far more likely to pick up marijuana than cocaine, even if
the district's asserted relation between substance abuse, athletes, and
disciplinary problems was accurate, there are far more direct ways to
deal with the problem. The most obvious way would be removal from
the team or even suspension from school for those causing the discipli-
nary problems. It is tempting to say that the district's policy was "a kind
of immolation of privacy and human dignity in symbolic opposition to
drug use."'" However, the Justice who made this claim in opposition to
the Custom Service drug testing policy in Von Raab wrote the majority
decision upholding Vernonia's policy.
IX. UPHOLDING DRUG TESTING FOR HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETES
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted the Supreme Court's
decisions in Skinner and Von Raab as well as other federal appellate
court decisions dealing with drug testing as requiring that the govern-
ment demonstrate "truly serious concerns of a safety nature.' 26 While
characterizing the Vernonia school district's goals as "worthy," they nev-
ertheless found that they "suffer by comparison to the kinds of dangers
that have existed when random testing has been approved.' 27 After its
drug testing program was stopped, the district appealed to a considera-
bly more sympathetic U.S. Supreme Court. Supported by the Clinton
Administration as well as both of President Clinton's appointments, the
Supreme Court upheld, in a six to three decision, Vernonia's drug testing
policy.
Justice Scalia's majority opinion noted that Vernonia's drug testing
program took place in a public school environment and stressed the
greatly attenuated expectations of privacy students possess in such a set-
ting. Thus, it is central to Scalia's view that the policy was aimed at "chil-
dren who have been committed to the temporary custody of the State as
123. JoiN GILLIOM, SURVEILLANCE, PRIVACY, AND THE LAW: EMPLOYEE DRUG TEST-
ING AND THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL CONTROL 55 (1994).
124. Id. For a somewhat similar argument, see Jurg Gerber et al., Drug Testing and Social
Controk Implications for State Theory, 14 CONTEMPORARY CRisES 243 (1990).
125. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 1398 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
126. Acton v. Vernonia School District 47J, 23 F.3d 1514, 1524 (9th Cir. 1994).
127. Id. at 1526.
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schoolmaster."" The school setting permits "a degree of supervision
and control that could not be exercised over free adults."'12 9 Conse-
quently, while making the obligatory assertion that children do not
"shed their constitutional rights ... at the schoolhouse gate ... ," the
Court goes on to greatly restrict the nature of the rights available.130
At this point the logic of the decision would seem to apply to all
students. Certainly, the degree to which this decision is limited to ath-
letes remains one of the main unanswered questions. Even though some
of Justice Scalia's majority opinion seems to apply to all students, it also
accentuates the specific circumstances of athletes. Athletes, it appears,
have even fewer expectations of privacy than the typical student, since
according to Scalia "school sports are not for the bashful."'' Beyond
the rather open and communal nature of the locker room facilities, ath-
letes also voluntarily subject themselves to a greater degree of regulation
than other students. Such regulations include preseason physical exami-
nations, adequate insurance coverage, minimum grade point average,
and various rules of conduct and training. Justice Scalia's point is to
claim that athletes are similar to workers who toil in a highly regulated
industry, and thus "ought to expect intrusions upon normal rights and
privileges, including privacy."' 32
Having made the case for a greatly reduced expectation of privacy,
the majority then argues that the drug testing employed by the school
district was only minimally intrusive and certainly did not violate the
already greatly diminished expectations of privacy possessed by athletes.
The Court's notion of the degree of intrusion caused by the tests seem to
be based on two considerations. First, the extent of monitoring is rather
indirect and the observation involved is no greater than would normally
be expected in a public restroom or locker room. Finally, the Court
seems unconcerned with the potential information that might be uncov-
ered through urinalysis. In their view, the school district only tests for
drugs, not other medical conditions, and the information is disclosed to
128. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2391 (1995).
129. Id. at 2392.
130. The reference is to Justice Fortas' oft quoted comment from Tinker v. Des Moines
School District, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). In most recent cases involving the application of
Constitutional rights to students the Court quotes Fortas and then proceeds to explain why the
right under question doesn't apply to students. This was certainly what happened here.
131. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2392.
132. Id. at 2393.
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only a limited number of school personnel and not made available to law
enforcement. 133
Under the balancing formula the Court increasingly employs in
Fourth Amendment cases, once the Court concluded that student ath-
letes possessed a "lesser expectation of privacy," all that remained was
to establish the governmental interest in obtaining the information.
Since the intrusion was regarded as fairly minimal, it is not apparent how
great a showing of special needs a school district needs to make. Both
the federal district court and the court of appeals felt that the search
needed to be justified by a compelling government interest. They simply
reached opposite conclusions as to whether a compelling need had been
demonstrated. Justice Scalia's opinion noticeably hedges on whether it
is even necessary in this context for government to demonstrate a com-
pelling need for the search. Justice Scalia asserts that the government
interest here is "important-indeed, perhaps compelling." 131 While this
formulation is far from precise, the majority clearly believes that "deter-
ring drug use by our Nation's schoolchildren is at least as important" as
the interests advanced in Skinner and Von Raab.35 Beyond the general
interest in deterring drug use, the majority notes the probable effects of
helping to prevent disruption in the schools and protecting the partici-
pants in athletic events.
In general the majority opinion is uninterested in exploring in any
detail questions about the limitations of drug testing, the efficacy of fo-
cusing on athletes, or the degree of deterrence that might be expected.
The Court breezily dismissed these concerns by asserting that "it seems
to us self-evident that a drug problem largely fueled by the 'role-model'
effect of athletes' drug use, and of particular danger to athletes, is effec-
tively addressed by making sure that athletes do not use drugs."' 3 6 The
factual assumptions the Court is willing to accept as self-evident are truly
breathtaking. Equally noteworthy is the ease with which the Court dis-
misses arguments suggesting that the same results could be achieved
with a testing mechanism that focused on individualized suspicion, and
thus did not seek to snare in its net those who had done nothing more to
arouse suspicion than entertain a desire to play competitive sports.
From the majority's perspective, testing based on reasonable suspicion
would be worse because it would put a "badge of shame" on those who
133. Id.
134. Id. at 2395.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 2395-96.
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are singled out and creates the risk that teachers would "impose testing
arbitrarily upon troublesome but not drug-likely students."'37 Finally,
and somewhat ironically, the Court rejects suspicion based testing be-
cause it puts teachers in the position of spotting drug abuse, a task for
which they are "ill prepared" and not "readily compatible with their vo-
cation.' 138 The Court worries that such difficulties might generate more
law suits and undermine the student-teacher relationship.
The Court does not make a convincing case for such claims. Cer-
tainly such arguments tend to turn traditional Fourth Amendment con-
siderations upside down. Anytime any government official engages in a
search, it potentially stigmatizes those who are singled out. One would
assume that this is one of the reasons for the concept of probable cause.
If government is going to invade someone's privacy and potentially sub-
ject them to the suspicions of their neighbors, then there needs to be
strong grounds to believe that a crime has been committed. We would
not accept a sweep search of a neighborhood on the theory that specify-
ing those who are most suspicious would be potentially stigmatizing.
Searching everyone might lessen the potential stigma on a type of misery
loves company argument, but it greatly expands the government inva-
sion of privacy. Arguably, the invasion of privacy is greater here be-
cause in the case of a sweep search, at least theoretically, we know that a
crime has been committed. Vernonia's drug testing policy assumes what
really is not known, that the use of drugs is widespread. If the evidence
is not convincing enough to establish individualized suspicion, why is it
convincing enough to assume the presence of a widespread problem?
The majority's increasing use of the argument that reasonableness,
not warrants and probable cause, constitutes the bottom line require-
ment of the Fourth Amendment tends to obscure the fact that it is suspi-
cion directed at an individual that makes a search reasonable. As Justice
O'Connor notes in dissent, random suspicionless drug testing is similar
to the type of general writs that the Fourth Amendment was clearly in-
tended to limit. "While the plain language of the Amendment does not
mandate individualized suspicion as a necessary component of all
searches and seizures, the historical record demonstrates that the fram-
ers believed that individualized suspicion was an inherent quality of rea-
sonable searches and seizures.' 39 Similarly, the majority's apparent
137. Id. at 2396.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 2399 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Clancy, The Role of Individualized
Suspicion in Assessing the Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 MEMPHIS ST. U. L.
REv. 483, 489 (1994)).
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concern that teachers might use individual suspicion to focus on a troub-
lesome but not drug using student is curious. No doubt this is a possibil-
ity, and should caution us against casual assumptions about rebellious
behavior and its linkage to drug use. But why then is it reasonable to
test a whole subset of students (athletes) because some students includ-
ing (but not limited to athletes) have been disruptive? Athletes as a
class certainly would not seem any more likely, indeed one might argue a
good deal less likely, to engage in casual use of street drugs. Given con-
ventional stereotypes, it would seem a better bet (although equally inva-
sive) to focus on rock bands. Certainly in the Acton case the evidence
was not focused just on athletes as a class and the disruptive problems
were not limited to them. Why is the Court worried about the badge of
shame that might be placed on a falsely accused troublesome student
when they are so clearly unconcerned about focusing on athletes as a
class?
The Court may be right in arguing that teachers are ill-prepared to
spot drug use, but this is certainly an odd argument after justifying drug
testing on the basis of teacher observation of an allegedly widespread
problem. Again, why are the generalized observations of some teachers
good enough to create a blanket requirement for testing athletes, but not
reliable when a teacher casts suspicion directly at an individual? Writing
about one's drug adventures in an English essay might or might not be
valid grounds for drug testing, but it would certainly appear to make a
more persuasive case for testing the writer then when generalized across
the entire range of participants in sports. Given the Court's watered
down individualized suspicion requirement, it is doubtful that courts
would demand much to justify a drug test. Indeed, such an approach
might have an added side benefit. If enough tests done on allegedly sus-
picious students are negative, teachers and administrators might become
less willing to make casual inferences.140 As it stands, there is no way to
know whether the school's inferences about a widespread problem were
right since, even when the vast majority of students test negative, the
proponents of the policy simply assume that the tests are performing a
deterrent function.
140. While he clearly misjudged how the Court would apply the T.L.O. decision to drug
testing, Eugene Lincoln argues that only when a student's at school behavior suggests they are
under the influence of drugs should they be subjected to a urinalysis. He goes further and
argues "that school officials have neither the authority nor the responsibility to regulate off-
campus conduct which has no bearing upon the proper maintenance of the educational pro-
cess." Eugene Lincoln, Mandatory Urine Testing for Drugs in Public Schools and the Fourth
Amendment: Some Thoughts for School Officials, 18 J. L. & EDUC. 181, 187 (1989).
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The Court's off-handed assertion that a policy based on individual-
ized suspicion might harm student-teacher relations seems equally mis-
placed. Clearly, a teacher mistakenly suspicious of a student might
undermine whatever was left of a trusting relationship, but what kind of
message of trust has the school district sent to James Acton and student
athletes like him.'4' It would seem to be a far more reasonable message,
and one much more directly a deterrent to disruptive behavior, to point
out that certain patterns of behavior will arouse suspicion of drug use. If
one does not want to be subjected to a urinalysis, then certain types of
behavior should be avoided.
The Court's willingness to focus on athletes is either a prelude to
justifying random drug testing of entire student bodies or is based on a
largely unexamined set of assumptions about athletes as role models.
The notion that somebody who might be regarded as a role model there-
fore deserves less constitutional protection is truly troublesome. Would
we accept the same argument for teachers, valedictorians, or members of
the debate team? Beyond this, we have no real reason to believe that
anyone's choice to engage in recreational drug or alcohol use is seriously
influenced by whether the high school quarterback does. An individuals
decision to engage in recreational drug use occurs for a wide variety of
psychological and social reasons. Knowing that the star athlete has used
drugs could be one of those, but this is only one of a wide variety of
social pressures that leads people to experiment. Moreover, why would
a person prone to experimentation decide not to simply because the star
athlete failed a drug test? It is hard to imagine why the debate team
member, the computer wizard, or the electric guitar players behavior
would be effected in any way by such a result. Indeed, the fear of getting
caught barely makes the list of reasons given by college athletes on why
they quit using drugs.' 42 The major reasons cited by NCAA athletes for
quitting were either concerns about health or realization that they did
141. In an article written before Acton, Chris Hutton argues persuasively that even if
courts are not likely to force school administrators to justify their drug testing programs,
schools should nevertheless be concerned about the messages students receive from such pro-
grams. He concludes that teaching students that "individual culpability or good behavior are
irrelevant when problems as serious as drug and alcohol abuse exist-will influence them long
after the short-term effect of testing has dissipated. Schools will have taught important lessons
about rights preserved by the Constitution, but perhaps the lesson is the opposite of what
society wants young people to learn." Chris Hutton, Schools as Good Parent: Symbolism ver-
sus Substance in Drug and Alcohol Testing of School Children, 21 J. L. & EDUc. 33, 69 (1992).
142. See SECOND REPLICATION OF A NATIONAL STUDY, Table 15 and Table 16 (NCAA
publication).
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not need or like the effects of drugs.143 Thus, continual education and
meaningful information about drug use is likely to have a more lasting
impact than fear of getting kicked off the team. It would certainly be
more consistent with the educational mission of public schools.144
X. CONCLUSION: DRUG TESTING AND SYMBOLIC CONTROL
The degree to which the Acton decision will stand as a justification of
the wider use of drug testing for college athletes or even all students is
obviously open to debate. Those interested in narrowing the scope of
this decision can point to the particular facts of the Vernonia situation
and seek to argue that a corresponding "epidemic" does not exist. But
this is a thin reed to try to limit the use of drug testing. It should not be
hard for any school district to find enough evidence to convince a Court
that their problem was similar in scope to Vernonia's. The attempt to
limit the use of testing to athletes is equally problematic. Justice Scalia's
majority opinion seemed to emphasize the lessened expectation of pri-
vacy for athletes but given his larger argument for the paternalistic role
of schools one should not be surprised if the Court continues to balance
away the Fourth Amendment rights of students.
However, one could easily argue that the paternalistic role of schools
at the high school level is not a meaningful argument for extending the
case for drug testing to college athletes. If one reads Justice Scalia's
opinion in Von Raab and compares it to his opinion in Acton, it is cer-
tainly possible to conclude that he might draw the line at high school.
Still, given the vagaries of balancing it is impossible to know how other
justices will weigh the alleged lessor expectation of privacy of athletes
against a schools stated need to maintain a safe and fair athletic pro-
gram. In short, is the Hill argument more likely to be accepted than the
Derdeyn argument? Given the ideological tendencies of the Court, this
writer is not optimistic that Derdeyn would prevail, but one hopes that at
some point the Court will rediscover some meaning in the Fourth
Amendment protections as it applies to drug testing.
Neither the Skinner and Van Raab decisions in 1989 nor the Acton
decision has the Court even attempted to engage in a serious analysis of
143. Id.
144. It has been argued that drug education programs haven't worked. However, as
Douglas Husak argues, because the "the introduction of scientifically respectable materials in
drug education programs has been politically unacceptable," most education programs have
been part of the War on Drugs not an alternative to it. Husak argues that a true education
program would differentiate between drug use and drug abuse. See DOUGLAS HUSAK. DRUGS
AND RiGHis 255 (1992).
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the realities of drug testing. The Court's unwillingness to look closely at
the limitations of drug testing suggests that it is willing to accept the
social control aspects of drug testing irrespective of whether it has any
meaningful impact on drug use in American society. Despite popular
conception, drug testing will not determine who is under the influence of
drugs. A positive test for marijuana by a football tackle on Monday
morning will at best only tell us that he inhaled sometime in the last
month. While this action undoubtedly did not make him a better foot-
ball player, the assumption that such exposure led to poor.execution and
unsafe play is highly dubious. Supposedly the prospect of drug testing
will deter the player from any use of drugs, but it is just as likely to lead
him to switch to a drug with less likelihood of being detected four weeks
later, cocaine or alcohol being the obvious possibilities. While to some
people deterring illegal drug use is sufficient justification, school districts
should not delude themselves that a switch from marijuana to alcohol
will have any significant effect on an athletes behavior, health, or per-
formance. According to the latest NCAA statistics, eighty-eight percent
of college athletes use alcohol compared to twenty-one percent who use
marijuana and one percent who use cocaine. 45 Neither the NCAA nor
Vernonia possess any testing policies aimed at alcohol abuse.
While alcohol use is illegal for those under twenty-one, it is clearly
more socially accepted. Still, if the justification for drug testing is to de-
ter drug consumption that contributes to unruly behavior and is harmful
to athletes, drug testing has rather severe limitations. Moreover, a posi-
tive test does not demonstrate that a person actually used the drug and
only necessitates a more extensive test. Neither Vernonia nor the Court
seem terribly concerned about the effects of a "false positive" and seem-
ingly treat the possibility as highly unlikely. Protecting against the possi-
bility of a false positive can get fairly costly. The NCAA with its
television driven wealth probably is not too concerned with this, but a
school district should be."
Ascertaining the real relationship between drug use and unruly be-
havior does not seem to have been a major motivator of schools like
Vernonia that have undertaken the use of drug testing. School adminis-
trators seem content to say that they are sending a message, but what
exactly is the message. It is clear that excluding alcohol from testing
145. See SECOND REPLICATION, supra note 142, at figure 4.
146. Cost considerations do seem to be limiting the extent to which school districts are
willing to create a policy similar to Vemonia's. It is obviously to early to tell how many school
districts will ultimately decide that the cost is worthwhile.
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makes little sense if the purpose of testing is to protect athletic health
and safety. However, such an exclusion makes perfect sense if the actual
purpose of the program is to send symbolic reassurance to the public
that something is being done about the use of illegal street drugs without
disturbing the more socially acceptable consumption of alcohol. Testing
for street drugs may not reduce the drug problem, but that probably is
not the point. As Lance Bennett has noted, public policies are fre-
quently the "means of affirming the larger images of the world on which
they are based. In most policy areas it is more acceptable to suffer fail-
ure based on correct theories than it would be to achieve success at the
price of sacrificing social values."147
It is the argument of this article that the widespread use of drug test-
ing without individualized suspicion sacrifices important social values.
Even though privacy and human dignity are values deeply rooted in our
Constitutional tradition, they seem to be values that many Americans
and the Supreme Court are ready to dismiss in the face of a widely held
perception of a drug epidemic. The complex interactions between a pub-
lic convinced of a rising drug threat, fueled by a media which plays to the
most sensationalized aspects of the problem, and further exacerbated by
public officials eager to reassure the public that something is being done
has created a climate in which drug testing is offered as a simple solution
to our problems. The Court has played an important role in legitimizing
drug testing for high school athletes. While some state courts may resist,
it seems likely that more school districts will experiment with such poli-
cies. We may deflect our awareness of the costs to privacy and human
dignity by noting that this is just for athletes or just for high school stu-
dents, but there should be little doubt that acceptance of such arguments
in the name of fighting a war on drugs creates a major exception to the
protections offered by the Fourth Amendment and a major expansion of
the social control role of our schools.
147. W. LANCE BENNETr, PUBLIC OPINION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 397 (1980).
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